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Praecipitia in Ruinam:  
The Decline of the Small Roman Farmer and the Fall of the Roman Republic  
  
 War and fraternal bloodshed dominated the late Roman Republic. From the tribunate of 
Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus in 133 to the beginning of the Augustan Principate in 27, Rome 
was wracked by internal dissention and political anarchy.1 The chaos was the product of the 
unbounded personal ambitions of Rome’s leading men—ambitions that were encouraged by a 
militaristic culture that impelled individual aristocrats to pursue fame and glory for themselves at 
all cost. Powerful Roman commanders made war with each other and sacked the city of Rome 
with their personal armies. “Violence,” according to Appian, “prevailed almost constantly, 
together with shameful contempt for law and justice.”2 This traumatic episode witnessed the 
dismantling of the oligarchic Republic and its replacement with a government ruled by the 
despotic authority of one man. Personal ambition tells only part of the story. The Republic was, 
in many ways, a victim of its own success. By 133 the Romans found themselves in command of 
a far-flung empire extending from Spain in the west to Asia Minor in the east, but they were 
forced to administer it with the government structure of a city-state. Rapid imperial expansion 
during the middle Republic strained nearly every aspect of the Roman system but none more so 
than the very foundation of Roman military strength—the small farmer. Spoils of war were 
channeled into agriculture by the landed elite, resulting in economic polarization and the 
displacement of independent labor in the countryside. This inquiry traces the socio-economic 
developments that led to the decline of independent farming in Rome, developments that 
culminated in political turmoil and civil war during the first century. 
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 The question of what caused the decline of the Roman Republic is a complex one. In 
answering it, many ancient and modern writers have held that the problems of the late Republic 
were caused by the steady deterioration of aristocratic morals throughout the second century. 
Sallust, a contemporary of G. Julius Caesar and Catiline, complained of the "shamelessness, 
bribery and rapacity" prevalent in the political life of his time, the "corruption of the public 
morals," and the "two great evils of... extravagance and avarice."3 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, 
writing towards the end of the first century, reflected on the virtuous days of the early Republic 
when Roman leaders “worked with their own hands, led frugal lives, did not chafe under 
honourable poverty, and, far from aiming at positions of royal power, actually refused them.”4 
The first century historian Velleius Patercullus complained of the “private luxury” and the 
“public extravagance” of Rome’s leading citizens.5  
 This view continues to attract its defenders. Historian R. E. Smith, for example, argues 
that the senatorial class was handling Rome’s problems just fine up until the end of the Third 
Punic War and that it was the “fundamentally irresponsible” behavior of the Gracchi that 
disrupted the traditional political system and set in motion the decline in aristocratic morals.6 
Historian David Shotter blamed the corrupting influence of imperial wealth for the gradual loss 
of the “old-fashioned corporateness” of Roman society and the rise in individualism among the 
Roman aristocracy.7 Historian Monte Pearson attributed the degeneration of aristocratic morals 
to imperial growth, the corruption of the political process, and the breakdown of collectivist 
norms that had once imposed an unshakeable restraining influence on the behavior of individual 
magistrates.8 Historian Pamela Marin drew attention to the erosion of long-held Roman ideals of 
patriotism and selfless service to the state and their replacement with “competition, desire, and 
greed” on the part of the Roman elite.9 Historian Ronald Syme focused on the incessant 
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squabbling of the Roman nobility and their corrupt, sinister, and fraudulent behavior in his 
discussion of the Republic’s end.10 
The central thrust of this traditional interpretation was that there was some sudden change 
in the behavior of the ruling aristocracy,11 that “love of office and the disgrace entailed by 
obscurity”12 seized the aristocracy and expanded the extent to which aristocrats were willing to 
go to win political power for themselves at the expense of the state. According to the argument, 
this was not always the case. The community sentiment of the early Republic imposed such a 
powerful constraint on aristocratic ambition and behavior that fame, glory, and wealth were not 
pursued at the expense of the common good. Prestige for one’s self and for one’s family was 
won through selfless acts of bravery that primarily benefitted the state rather than the 
individual.13 This selfless behavior was engendered by the unusually high value the typical 
Roman placed on his citizenship. It gave even the lowliest member a stake in the future of his 
great city, and it created a sense of community that permeated every rung of Roman society.14 As 
the second century satirist Lucilius so romantically put it, virtue is “thinking our country’s 
interests to be foremost of all, our parents’ next, and then thirdly and lastly our own.15 The sense 
of community broke down by the first century. Deprived of cities to besiege and armies to defeat, 
so the argument goes, members of the ruling elite eventually turned their competitive wrath on 
each other.16 Constructive competition turned destructive as personal prestige took precedence 
over the well-being of the Roman state, and whereas the heroes of Rome’s wars of expansion 
fought for the glory of their country and the praise of their fellow citizens, the leading men of the 
late Republic fought simply to enhance their personal fame and wealth. 
Roman culture was indeed highly competitive, especially for those at the top of the social 
hierarchy.17 Historian Norman Cantor described it as a “one-class” society dominated by a single 
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group—the Roman nobilitas.18 Collectively, this group monopolized all military and political 
power and steered the affairs of the Roman state. Individually, however, aristocrats of the 
Republic exercised political power indirectly by way of elections and assemblies.19 Winning the 
esteem of other aristocrats was crucial if one was to enjoy influence over the political process. 
Therefore, the Roman ruling elite sought to constantly outdo each other in terms of prestige, 
fame, and glory, for winning all three meant leverage in the assemblies and election to the 
magistracies. For an ambitious aristocrat, the shortest route to glory and fame—and political 
power—was through a successful military command. Evidence of this can be seen the peculiar 
characteristics of Roman culture itself, a culture which—through its outward physical symbols, 
its stories of past heroes, and its social rewards system—cherished military success above all 
other social accomplishments. The high value placed on warfare increased the frequency and 
severity of Rome’s wars and explains, at least in part, the rapid march of Roman power 
throughout Italy and the Mediterranean during the early and middle Republic.20 In this way at 
least, the aristocratic pursuit of glory and fame through warfare served the interests of the Roman 
state, for the competitive energies of the ruling aristocracy were absorbed by neighboring 
communities during the initial flush of Roman expansion. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the 
typical Roman aristocrat was exposed to combat and military command at an early age and 
throughout his political career.21  
The moral interpretation of the Republic’s decline has some serious flaws. Greed, 
ambition, and lust for power are constants in human nature, and as Harris convincingly 
demonstrates, the aristocratic pursuit of fame and glory was not exclusive to the late Republic—
competition for both among the Roman elite was already vigorous during the late-fourth 
century.22 Roman aristocrats preferred fame to obscurity long before the so-called period of 
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moral decline in the second century, and it is therefore unreasonable to assume that the nobility 
of the late Republic were less ambitious than their counterparts in the early Republic.23 
Furthermore, the use of violence in domestic politics was just as common, if not more so, during 
the early Republic as in later times. This was especially true during the Conflict of the Orders, a 
drawn-out civil struggle in the fifth and fourth centuries waged by the lesser nobility to break the 
higher nobility’s exclusive grip on political power.24 The assertion that ambition, greed, and 
political violence were the main drivers of political decline is seriously undermined by the 
presence of these tendencies during the early days of the Republic. Furthermore, the moral 
interpretation is far too simplistic and superficial and does little to acknowledge the immense 
socio-economic changes brought on by the process of empire. Rome found it increasingly 
difficult to replenish its legions as the economic position of its yeomanry declined. The 
manpower shortage was a chronic symptom of fundamental economic changes occurring at the 
heart of Rome’s traditional, subsistence-based economy. Marius saw professionalization as the 
only means of balancing the recruiting deficit, and his decision to enlist property-less men in his 
supplementum of 107 was one of monumental consequence for the later history of the Republic. 
Professional armies became instruments of unscrupulous commanders who were willing to use 
them against the state. Political decline and civil war were thus the final steps in a long economic 
process that originated in the late-third century. Rome’s independent farmers were squeezed by a 
number of specific economic developments including the development of large estates, the influx 
of slave labor, the importation of cheap grain from newly acquired provinces, and a sharpening 
of the economic divide separating the landed elite from the urban and rural proletarii.  
The growth of Rome’s Mediterranean empire during the second century was both rapid 
and unplanned, and it set in motion a number of economic developments that, in combination, 
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fundamentally altered the nature of Rome’s traditional subsistence economy. Wars of conquest 
brought untold wealth into the city in the form of plunder, tribute, and slaves. These went 
overwhelmingly to members of the nobilitas who, in turn, channeled this new wealth into 
agriculture—the most lucrative and sustainable investment available at the time. Independent 
farmers found themselves unable to compete with the latifundia, large agglomerations of public 
land and abandoned farms. These sprawling estates made extensive use of slave labor and 
concentrated on the production of lucrative goods like olives, grapes, and animal products. 
Commercial farms enjoyed the benefit of scale, and their use of cheap slave labor gave them a 
cost advantage over small farms that had to rely on the efforts of their owners. Many yeomen 
were economically ruined and forced to sell their holdings to rich investors, furthering the cycle 
of dislocation and impoverishment.25 Meanwhile, imperial growth brought new provinces into 
the Roman orbit, territories that were particularly efficient at producing grain for consumption in 
Roman cities. The introduction of Spanish, North African, and Sicilian grain to the Roman 
market lowered its price made it impossible for small farmers to compete. Taken together, these 
developments led to a sharp reduction in the Roman middle class and a radical shift from a 
traditional subsistence economy to a market-oriented one.26 Imperial growth thus struck at the 
heart of Rome’s strength in ways that its conquered enemies never could. The weakening of the 
Roman middle class brought on a progressive decline in the number of men qualified to serve in 
the army, leading to a military recruitment crisis in the late-second century that served as the 
prime motivation for the reforms of Marius. 
 New wealth was one of the principal stimulants of socio-economic change throughout the 
second century. In a short period of time, Rome was transformed from a rural backwater into 
magnificent urban metropolis as war booty and tribute flowed into the city. The din of new 
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construction was constant as the city became adorned with elaborate new temples, gymnasia, 
baths, and palaces. Plunder from the communities of the Hellenistic east was a particularly 
lucrative source for the treasury and the aristocracy. L. Aemilius Paullus Macedonicus’s 
triumphal procession of 167 is largely representative. It took three days to complete. The first 
was scarcely long enough to exhibit the priceless works of plundered Greek art, carried through 
the city streets on 250 wagons. The next day featured carts upon carts of fine Macedonian arms 
and armor along with some 2,250 talents of silver carried in large pots by some 3,000 men. The 
third displayed 231 talents of gold, 400 gold wreaths, and the enslaved royal coterie. Aemilius 
left these riches for the state treasury, but he took the entire Macedonian library for himself.27 
 Tribute was another means of extracting wealth from conquered people. Defeated rulers 
were saddled with crushing indemnities for resisting Rome. Phillip II of Macedon, for example, 
was made to pay 1,000 talents of silver after his defeat at the hands of Titus Quinctius 
Flamininus in 197,28 and the Seleucid ruler Antiochus III was forced to pay a ruinous 15,000 
talents in 188.29 
 Roman aristocrats funneled the wealth they derived from foreign commands and 
provincial governorships into land ownership and agriculture. Agriculture, for both social and 
economic reasons, was the most attractive investment available to a rich aristocrat during the late 
Republic. Romans held an elevated view of land ownership, and Roman culture associated 
farming with lofty social values. Members of the nobility competed with each other by 
increasing their landed possessions much like they did in commissioning grandiose works of art, 
constructing new public buildings, and sponsoring elaborate public games and festivals. Cato 
called farming the “most highly respected” occupation.30 Varro perceived agricultural work as 
the key to a healthy body and a cure for idleness.31 Cicero claimed that there was “none more 
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profitable, none more delightful” than agriculture.32 Agriculture was so valued that Roman 
senators were legally prohibited from engaging in any profitable activity other than farming out 
of a fear that doing so would taint their character.33 Large-scale farming was also the safest and 
most sustainable source of continuous wealth for the ruling class.34 While election to the higher 
magistracies had the potential of yielding considerable returns for a successful commander, it 
was difficult to secure and never certain. Because of this, the typical aristocrat felt intense 
pressure to make his fortune quickly once appointed to a command or a governorship. He then to 
sank that wealth into land upon leaving office. Doing so guaranteed his long-term financial 
health and that of his progeny.35 
Through purchases, extortion, or force, the wealthy gradually expanded their estates by 
acquiring adjoining farms and encroaching upon the ager publicus.36 The landscape of Italy 
came to be dominated by these latifundia, many of which grew far larger than the stipulated 500 
iugera maximum set by Roman law.37 Appian, Livy, and Plutarch are unanimous in attributing 
the problems of the late-Republic to the growth of these estates.38 These commercial farms 
employed large numbers of slaves.39 Unlike tenant labor, slaves were a substantial fixed cost, 
and it was because of this that slaves had to be worked longer and more intensively than wage 
laborers. Aristocratic landowners had an incentive to capitalize on economies of scale in the 
presence of such fixed labor costs. They did this by concentrating on the mass production of a 
few commodities that could be profitably exported to urban and overseas markets. Included in 
this category were olive oil, wine, meat, and hides, products that commanded much higher prices 
than grain. These goods held a much higher value-to-weight ratio than cereals, a characteristic 
that made them ideal for export. 
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The economic independence of Rome’s small farmers was further harmed by the 
exactions of war. Rome’s ad hoc system of army recruitment worked, as long as campaigns were 
short enough and close enough to home to allow veterans to return to their farms with minimal 
disruption to their normal routines.40 However, as campaigning seasons grew longer and legions 
went further afield from the First Punic War onward, the farmer-legionnaire of the middle 
Republic came to be called away from home for much longer than his counterpart in the early 
Republic. Many farms were ruined for want of maintenance and subsequently abandoned by 
their owners.41 Dionysius of Halicarnassus recounted the plight of Cincinnatus who, upon being 
called away from his plough, lamented, “my field will go unsown this year, and we shall be in 
danger of having not enough to live on.”42 Although a legendary story, the sentiment was 
probably shared by scores of small farmers who were called away for extended service in the 
legions. Livy and Polybius also tell of farms suffering physical destruction at the hands of 
rampaging armies, both Roman and foreign, especially during the Hannibalic War.43 Scores of 
veterans returned home only to behold the burnt remnants of their once-productive farms and 
were forced to sell or abandon their plots when they could afford neither the resources nor the 
time to restore them.44 
Slavery was a critical component of the latifundia system of agricultural production and 
an important facilitator of peasant dislocation. Slavery was not a new institution for the 
Romans—they had been enslaving their foes since the early Republic45—but both the number of 
slaves and their importance to the Roman economy grew precipitously throughout the second 
century. Chattel labor gradually supplanted free peasant labor in the countryside, but the 
displacement was not complete. There remained a substantial number of non-slave laborers 
working the land well into the first century.46 Still, the consolidation of innumerable small farms 
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into large, slave-worked ones had the effect of reducing the employment of free, non-slave labor 
in the countryside.47 This dislocated an immense rural labor force that had previously been 
fastened to small plots. Some emigrated to the provinces. Others remained to labor on the estates 
of the rich as free but property-less laborers. Many flocked to the cities to swell the ranks of the 
urban poor. Although the rich employed both freemen and slaves on their farms, they preferred 
the latter. Why this is so is less clear, and several hypotheses have been advanced.48 However, 
the profit motive was the foremost concern of wealthy landlords, so slave labor was probably 
preferred because it was the lower cost production method in the long run.49 Indeed, the 
profitable acquisition of slaves was probably an important influence on the willingness of Roman 
aristocrats to go to war during the second century, as Harris has suggested.50 Slaves, unlike free 
laborers, were exempt from military service, and the natural reproduction of slaves meant that 
the value of the initial investment was constantly increasing.51 
Like the concentration of land ownership, the growth of slavery was a product of 
overseas expansion. War captives from newly-conquered territories were the main source of 
slaves.52 The great bulk was extracted from provinces conquered during the second and first 
centuries. Thousands of Spaniards, Illyrians, Greeks, Gauls, Macedonians, and Africans were 
forced under the Roman yoke as the great Roman war machine lumbered through their 
territories. One consul reportedly took 150,000 slaves during a single punitive campaign.53 
Estimates place Roman slave imports to Italy at between 100 and 300 million throughout the 
period of the Republican empire, far more than were involved in the transatlantic slave trade 
during the age of colonialism.54 The unfortunates were employed in nearly every occupation as 
stewards, secretaries, builders, architects, household servants, readers, physicians, and tutors to 
name but a few.55 Most were unskilled and were put to work in sprawling plantations where they 
10
International Social Science Review, Vol. 92, Iss. 1 [], Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.northgeorgia.edu/issr/vol92/iss1/1
served as key inputs into an agricultural system that produced massive surpluses for the market. 
The wealthy owned the most slaves. Crassus, a man who was worth 142 million dollars (as 
measured in 2004 U.S. dollars), employed 500 slaves for his building projects in Rome alone.56 
Most suffered a brutal existence. Cato, for example, reportedly flogged his slaves for the 
slightest error in serving food and drinks to his guests.57  
Roman slavery was unique in a number of ways, especially in the nature of the master-
slave relationship. Slaves were granted both their freedom (libertas) and their citizenship 
(civitas) upon their emancipation (manumissio), a unique feature of Roman law and one that was 
established very early on in the history of the republic.58 Emancipation was the constant hope of 
Roman slaves, and most understood that this was attainable through good behavior and loyalty 
rather than rebellion. Although a former slave faced some social stigma, a freed person was more 
fully integrated into Roman society than in other slave societies. The act of manumission created 
a patron-client relationship between the freedman and his former owner, and because clients 
were obligated to provide their patrons with political support, ambitious politicians had an 
incentive to free as many slaves as possible to build a solid voting base in the forum and in the 
popular assemblies.59 The incidence of manumission was therefore relatively high during the 
Republic, and this sustained a strong motivation within slaves to be diligent in their work.60 As a 
group, freedmen were numerous, and they played an important role in Roman politics.61 By the 
late Republic more than a few prominent statesmen possessed slave ancestry. All of this is not to 
say that slavery was a desirable condition. Roman slaves, like their counterparts in other socio-
economic systems, were treated with a degree of harshness and inhumanity that is difficult to 
comprehend. Slaves were the property of their masters, subject to all their whims and desires. 
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Still, overall, the legal device of manumission provided both a strong incentive for slaves to be 
cooperative and an additional source of political support for ambitious politicians. 
Just as they steered decisions on how to produce, market incentives steered landowners’ 
decisions on what to produce. As profit-seeking actors, Roman aristocrats rejected grain in favor 
of olive oil, wine, and animal products, high-margin cash crops that could withstand the cost of 
transportation.62 The demand for grain, however, only increased throughout the period of 
agricultural innovation. Rome’s population grew throughout the third and second centuries, and 
massive quantities of grain were required to feed it. The conversion of Italian land into pastures, 
vineyards, and orchards reduced the grain yield of Italy at the same time that demand was 
increasing, but this was offset by large imports from Sardinia, Sicily, Spain, and North Africa.63 
These provinces held a comparative advantage in the production of grain. So efficient were their 
fields that the Roman grain supply experienced no chronic crisis during the latter second 
century.64 The conversion of the Mediterranean into a Roman-controlled lake throughout the 
century lowered the cost of shipping further than it already had been and made trafficking in 
grain a profitable endeavor for both public and private entities.65 That long-distance trade was 
sufficient to meet the demand of large urban populations in Rome and in Italy's other urban 
centers is supported by the very existence of these large, non-farming populations.66 Grain 
imports from efficient provincial sources put downward pressure on the price of grain and 
created yet another source of hardship for small farmers. With their limited production volumes 
and higher per-unit costs, independent farmers could not cover their expenses at the market price 
and were forced out of business.67 
The assertion above rests on the assumption that Roman Italy's grain market was linked 
to the regional grain markets of its provincial periphery, that the price of grain was more or less 
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consistent throughout the Mediterranean. This assumption has been challenged by historians of 
the twentieth century. M. I. Finley rejected the idea, claiming that ancient societies, Rome 
included, “did not have an economic system which was an enormous conglomeration of 
interdependent markets.”68 Paul Erdkamp echoed him three decades later.69 Economic historian 
Peter Temin, however, has convincingly shown that the Roman economy was a market oriented 
economy in which price was determined by the interaction of supply and demand, that a 
significant volume of goods and services were exchanged in markets, and that “the parts of this 
economy located far from each other were not tied together as tightly as markets often are today, 
but they still functioned as part of a comprehensive Mediterranean market.”70 Through an 
empirical analysis of the existing data, Temin showed that grain prices moved in response to the 
forces of supply and demand, and he demonstrated that enough goods and services were 
exchanged in markets to consider the Roman economy, overall, a market-driven one.71 He also 
showed that Roman grain farmers faced a highly competitive market and were price takers. That 
is, individual farmers took the market price for wheat as a given and were unable to affect it. 
Therefore, farmers made production decisions, including decisions on whether or not to continue 
producing, based on a monolithic market price.72 
 This new interpretation paints the Roman economy as a dynamic, evolving system, one 
that underwent a period of profound change during the second century in response to external 
stimuli. Seen in this way, the shift in Roman agricultural production from many small, inefficient 
producers to a smaller number of larger, more efficient ones was a natural outcome for the 
Roman economy as a whole made possible by the injection of large amounts of liquid capital. 
The price of grain fell as land, labor, and capital were diverted towards the most efficient means 
of production, the latifundia. The older system based on small independent farmers collapsed 
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simply because small farmers were less efficient than the large estates and provincial grain 
producers who supplanted them. The contribution of latter was made economically viable by the 
reduction in shipping costs following Rome's victory over Carthage, her chief maritime rival in 
the Mediterranean, in the first and second Punic wars. Cheaper shipping set the stage for regional 
specialization based on comparative advantage. Italian agriculture increasingly specialized in the 
production of high-value crops while the periphery concentrated on producing a high volume of 
grain for consumption at the core. As in all economic decisions, tradeoffs were involved. Some 
were made winners while others lost as the structural adjustments took place. Members of the 
landed aristocracy were clear winners, as were the private individuals involved in the pan-
Mediterranean grain trade. The losers, of course, were the thousands of small agriculturalists 
who were economically displaced at a time when Rome had no significant urban industries to 
absorb their productive energies. The “proletarianization”73 of the Roman small farmer was 
therefore a complex process of structural economic adjustment set in motion by capital asset 
formation (slaves and liquid wealth) and the emergence of regional specialization based on 
comparative advantage—both side effects of imperial expansion during the middle Republic.  
A brief review of Roman army organization is useful at this juncture. The strength of the 
Roman Republican army was based on a citizen militia of property-owners who were first 
divided into five wealth-based classes by the legendary Roman king Servius Tullius of the late-
sixth century.74 Livy defined the property requirements for the five classes as those who held a 
minimum of 100,000 (Class I), 75,000 (Class II), 50,000 (Class III), 25,000 (Class IV), and 
11,000 asses (Class V).75 As in classical Greece, Roman infantrymen were expected to furnish 
their own arms and armor.76 The first class was the equites, Roman cavalrymen rich enough to 
maintain horses. The next three classes encompassed the three degrees of heavy infantry, the 
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hastati, principes, and the triarii. The lowest and poorest class formed the Roman light infantry 
skirmishers, the velites.77 Those who did not meet the requirement for the lowest class were 
excluded from service in the legions, but these proletarii were not absolved of the duty to serve. 
They were compelled to row in the navy and to take up arms to defend the city in times of 
exceptional emergency.78 Legions were called up for some specific campaign by the consuls 
through the dilectus, first in Rome itself and then in allied (socii) cities by consular 
representatives.79 Allied contingents (alae sociorum) contributed approximately half of the 
typical army’s military strength, sometimes even more. Soldiers received a negligible amount of 
pay through the tributum to partially compensate for expenses incurred while on campaign.80 
Legions were then disbanded after hostilities had ceased or the campaigning season had ended, 
and soldiers returned to their fields.81  
Rome found it increasingly difficult to raise troops as the number of propertied citizens 
(assidui) declined,82 and the poorest members of the assidui were struggling to survive by 
midcentury. Using conservative estimates of land prices, wheat yields, and nutritional 
requirements, Brunt convincingly shows that 4,000 asses—the minimum wealth requirement for 
the fifth and lowest class of assidui—was insufficient to feed a typical Roman family of four.83 
Evidence for this persistent recruiting crisis can be seen in the progressive reduction in the fifth 
class wealth requirement.84 What was probably a temporary measure to replenish the ranks 
following the disasters at Cannae and Trasimene during the Second Punic War became a 
permanent change made necessary by Rome’s constant wars of expansion throughout the second 
century. This reduction was carried out twice throughout the middle Republic: from 11,000 asses 
to 4,000 asses during the Hannibalic War and then to 1,500 asses around the time of the 
Gracchan Revolution.85 The census was eventually abandoned altogether as the basis for military 
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recruitment in 107 under Marius.86 The dramatic reduction in the wealth requirement of the fifth 
class artificially increased the number of assidui by allowing ever increasing numbers of 
proletarii to qualify for service in the legions. Brunt agrees that manpower shortages were the 
impetus behind these reductions, offering as evidence the “difficulties that magistrates 
encountered in some years in carrying out levies, the concern evinced by Tiberius Gracchus and 
his contemporaries at a putative decline in manpower, and a decision... to raise once more the 
proportion of allies serving with the legions.”87 
The expansion of Rome’s Mediterranean empire simultaneously increased the demand 
for recruits and, through the effect of victory on the Roman economy, reduced their supply, a 
dual squeeze that, in the absence of fundamental reforms, made the professionalization of the 
Roman army almost inevitable. Rome pacified many enemies in the years following their victory 
over Hannibal. The Romans tangled with a variety of Gallic and Germanic peoples to their west 
and north—the Boii, Insubres, Allobroges, and Arverni in Northern Italy; the Celtiberi and 
Lusitani in Hispania; and the Teutones, Ambrones, and Cimbri in Transalpine Gaul. The Romans 
dealt with the Numidians and the Carthaginians in northern Africa, and they subdued the Greeks, 
Macedonians, Thracians, Pergamenes, and Seleucids of the eastern Mediterranean. While 
chronic, the recruitment problem approached crisis levels in the last decades of the second 
century, a time when the Romans faced acute demands for military manpower from several 
fronts. The Cimbri and the Teutones, Germanic tribes from beyond the Rhine, began encroaching 
upon Roman territory in 113 and defeated several consular armies in southern Gaul before they 
were defeated by Marius in 102 and 101 respectively.88 The defeat of Gnaeus Manlius and 
Quintus Servilius Caepio at the hands of the Cimbri in 105 was particularly devastating. The 
consuls barely escaped with their lives, and Roman loses totaled 80,000 soldiers and 40,000 
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camp attendants.89 Meanwhile, the Romans waged the Jugurthine War in Africa from 111-105, a 
protracted struggle against a nimble enemy that perplexed several Roman commanders.90  
Gaius Marius is a looming figure in the history of the Roman Republic, an uncommonly 
talented soldier, commander, and military organizer with complex political inclinations. He 
played a large role in the Jugurthine War and was instrumental in defeating the Cimbri and 
Teuotones. More importantly, it was he who undertook the final step of professionalizing the 
Roman army. Marius, according to Plutarch, was “born of parents who were altogether 
obscure—poor people who lived by the labour of their own hands.”91 He served with distinction 
under Scipio Aemilanus, the destroyer of Carthage, during the Numantine campaign as military 
tribune in 134 and as Quaestor in 127.92 Marius was elected to the tribunate in 119 at the age of 
38, and in 115 he won election to the praetorship and was awarded the governorship of Hispania 
Ulterior.93 The consul Caecilius Metellus selected Marius as one of his legates in the war against 
Jugurtha in 109, but Marius soon asked for leave to campaign for the consulship.94 He leveraged 
the growing disillusionment with aristocratic military leadership during his campaign and won 
the consulship of 107 at the age of 50.95 His famous supplementum of 107 came in the immediate 
aftermath of this victory.96 
Marius’ supplementum marked the final transition of the Roman army from a citizen 
militia of propertied men to a state-funded professional force, but its significance has been 
overstated.97 It loses much of its impact when viewed in relation to the long-run changes 
undergone by the citizen militia throughout the second century. The Roman army was moving 
towards professionalization long before Marius, evidenced by the growing “continuity of 
service” and a rising “mercenary outlook” among the Roman soldiery.98 The need to serve for 
extended periods on campaign increased the burdens of legionary service and created economic 
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losses that “gave rise to a demand that citizen soldiers should be rewarded on discharge after 
service...”99 Furthermore, the dwindling number of assidui and the consequent shortage of 
recruits were felt long before 107. Shortages had prompted the use of volunteers at least twice 
before.100 Already in Polybius’ time there was an established precedent of the state furnishing 
arms and armor to its soldiers, perhaps to achieve uniformity, but the practice made obsolete the 
old rule that soldiers must be wealthy enough to supply their own equipment.101 The failure of 
the Gracchi to address the problem at its source made the final reduction in the census 
requirement a military necessity, and at 1,500 asses the poorest members of the assidui were 
virtually indistinguishable from the proletarii by Marius’ time. In any case, as noted before, even 
the higher requirement of 4,000 asses was probably insufficient to guarantee that a man could 
sustain his family, let alone furnish his own panoply, and the much lower requirement of 1,500 
asses totally precluded such a possibility. In light of these developments, Marius' enlistment of 
the capite censei in 107 seems less revolutionary than it is usually portrayed.102  
Marius’ intentions in enlisting the proletarii are somewhat harder to discern, but there is 
little evidence that he was motivated by political ambition as his enemies have suggested.103 
Instead, his supplementum was probably motivated by military necessity. As Sherwin-White 
pointed out, soldiers at this stage were not yet willing to commit violence against the state on 
behalf of their generals.104 Indeed, by pursuing legislation for their settlement, Marius supported 
his veterans more than they supported him. He was not a radical reformer, and while he did 
associate with the radical Lucius Appuleius Saturninus to secure land allotments for his veterans, 
he repeatedly demonstrated an unwillingness to remove senatorial authority.105 Marius was 
“conditioned by the political habits of the second century,” an “unimaginative child of his 
age.”106 That is, he sought power within the context of the existing senatorial system and did not 
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dream of supplanting the establishment through violence. That destructive innovation was left 
for others to pursue. 
Whatever his intentions, Marius' enlistment of the capitei sensei had enormous 
consequences for the Republic. The connection between land ownership and military service was 
decisively severed, and veterans gave their loyalty to unscrupulous commanders who did not 
hesitate to use them against the state. During the middle Republic, veterans of Rome's wars 
simply returned to their farms and resumed their lives, but that happy equilibrium was destroyed 
along with the economic position of Rome's independent agriculturalists. Possessing little to no 
property, veterans of the Marian period needed a place in Roman society upon discharge. Marius 
solved this problem by settling his veterans in Africa and Italy with the help of Saturninus, a 
ruthless demagogue.107 He also awarded Roman citizenship, a coveted prize, to those among his 
soldiers who had displayed “conspicuous bravery” on campaign.108 Marius' optimate opponents 
in the senate generally opposed both the settlements and the granting of citizenship, and their 
obstructionism made the political establishment an enemy in the minds of veterans and generals 
alike. Therefore, the connection between a commander and his veterans—already stiffened by 
many years of hard service under austere conditions—was further solidified by the presence of a 
common enemy in Marius' time. Once discharged, veterans remained connected to their former 
commanders, and they expected the opportunity to share in the spoils of future campaigns.109 
Their economic well-being became tied to the success of their generals, and they gave their 
loyalty to commanders who promised to provide for them in peace and to lead them to plunder in 
war. The terrible potential for the misuse of veterans was realized when Sulla marched on Rome 
with six legions of his veterans in 88.110 Sulla’s example was followed many times: by Lucius 
Cornelius Cinna in 87, by Sulla again in 82, and by Marcus Aemilius Lepidus in 78.111 The 
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situation continued to worsen as the Republic entered its twilight phase. Gnaeus Pompeius, 
Julius Caesar, Gaius Octavius, and Marcus Antonius chased each other around the empire 
leaving death and destruction in their wake while the senatorial oligarchy in Rome sat helpless 
and unable to intervene. Civil war had come to Rome. The convulsions of the late Republic were 
essentially a series of painful but logical changes to the political-economy of the Roman state. 
Economic restructuring brought about by imperial growth culminated in the rise of personal 
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